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Whose Business is Your Pancreas?
Potential Privacy Problems in New York City's
Mandatory Diabetes Registry
Harold J. Krent, J.D.
Nicholas Gingo, Monica Kapp, Rachel Moran, Mary Neal, Meghan
Paulas, Puneet Sarna, and Sarah Suma*
In 2006, New York City authorities passed a regulation mandating that
individual medical data from nearly all diabetics in the city be stored in a
centralized registry.1 New York's diabetes registry is the first in the nation
to require collection of personal testing data for the purpose of monitoring
treatments for a noninfectious disease. In establishing the registry, public
health officials seek to study, monitor, and eventually slow the rising tide of
diabetes diagnoses among city residents.2 Incidences of diabetes-related
health problems and even deaths have increased exponentially in recent
years, and the toll on worker productivity and tax dollars has been
substantial .3
New York City's program has not yet been implemented in its entirety.
Nonetheless, the registry's potential to compromise individual privacy
warrants examination now to ensure that other cities do not copy New
York's model (both with respect to diabetes and other noninfectious
diseases) without carefully considering the privacy concerns at stake in
such registries. In Part I of this paper we first describe New York City's
diabetes registry, and then distinguish the city's program from prior
registries in the United States and Europe. Part II sketches some of the
legal and ethical problems that may arise as the registry program becomes
. Professor Krent is Dean at Chicago-Kent College of Law. Each year he works closely on a
legal project with Chicago-Kent Honors Scholars during their second year at school. He has
been impressed with the drive, cohesion, and talent of the group that studied New York
City's mandatory diabetes registry. This paper derives from the group's research and
discussions.
I. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 (2003-2006).
2. See id. at n.1.
3. See id.; Ryung Suh, An Aging Workforce: Health-Related Productivity and the
Economic Value of Health Promotion, MEDSCAPE PUB. HEALTH & PREVENTION, Aug. 2006,
http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/543680.
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fully operational. We conclude in Part III with cautionary advice regarding
future efforts to create public health registries.
PART I-DIABETES TESTING AND REGISTRIES
A. The New York City Diabetes Registry
On January 15, 2006, New York City implemented a regulation requiring
all testing labs in the city to report the'test results of all AIC diabetes test
subjects to the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene
("NYCDOHMH").4 The city intends to use these test results to address the
growing diabetes epidemic among its residents.5 This section explores the
test reporting program and its planned uses by the city.
1. The A to C of AIC Testing
Diabetics can check their blood sugar level on a daily basis by using a
self-administered instantaneous test.6  Physicians may also conduct an
instantaneous test during patient appointments. However, these tests
measure a diabetic's blood sugar level only at the moment the test is taken.7
Moreover, instantaneous tests may produce false readings if the patient fails
to administer the test properly.8 Even if the test is conducted at a doctor's
office, the diabetic's blood sugar level may be abnormally high on any
given day, in which case the results would not reflect an accurate depiction
of the patient's average blood sugar level. 9
The AIC test, unlike instantaneous blood sugar tests, guards against false
readings by measuring the average amount of sugar in the diabetic's blood
over the prior 120 days.1 0 Sugar in the diabetic's blood stream binds to the
hemoglobin in the red blood cells through a process called glycosylation."
Once the sugar binds to the hemoglobin, the sugar stays bound for the entire
120 day life of the red blood cell.1 2 The greater the amount of sugar in the
diabetic's blood stream, the more hemoglobin binds with sugar, and
4. See id.
5. See id.
6. American Diabetes Assocation, AIC Test, http://www.diabetes.org/type-1-






11. Diabetic Drug Store, The ABCs of Hemoglobin AlC Testing,
http://www.diabetestoolbox.com/HbA lC.asp (last visited Sept. 16, 2007).
12. Id.
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therefore the more hemoglobin becomes glycosylated.13  The AIC test
measures the percentage of hemoglobin that has been glycosylated.14 This
glycosylation level indicates the amount of glucose present in a diabetic's
blood for the prior 120 days.' 5
Because the AIC test measures a diabetic's AIC level over a 120 day
period, the test result is not affected by momentary spikes in the diabetic's
blood sugar level. 16  Moreover, if the results from a diabetic's self-
administered instantaneous tests are inconsistent with the AIC test, the
diabetic's doctor may infer that the diabetic is not administering the
instantaneous test properly. 17  The American Diabetes Association
("ADA") recommends that diabetics maintain a glycosylation (AIC) level
below seven percent,' 8 and suggests that all diabetics receive the AIC test
between two and four times per year.' 9 A diabetic patient may also submit
a blood sample to his doctor or any certified lab for an AIC test.2
2. AIC Results: Out of the Lab and Into the AIC Registry
Article 13 of New York City's Health Code requires that all certified
laboratories report AIC test results to the NYCDOHMH. 21  The Code
requires each lab to submit the following information to NYCDOHMH"2 :
* The full name, date of birth, and address of the diabetic.
13. See id.
14. See Nancy J. Nordenson, Glycosylated Hemoglobin Test, Blue Cross & Blue Shield
of Mass., July 14, 1999, http://www.ahealthyme.com/topic/alctest (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
15. Id.
16. American Diabetes Association, AIC Test, supra note 6.
17. Id.
18. American Diabetes Association, Checking Your Blood Glucose,




21. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04(c) (2003-2006).
22. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.03(a) (2003-2006).
But cf The Joint Commission, Search Results: State of New York, General Laboratory Tests,
http://www.qualitycheck.org/consumer/searchResults.aspx?ddstatelist2=NY&ddcitylist--
I &st cd=&st=-NY&st_nm=NEW+YORK&cty_nm=&cty_id- I &careld= 161 &carelDtracker 161
(last visited Nov. 14, 2007). There are over 100 laboratories in the State of New York that
are outside the purview of the NYCDOHMH because they are located outside New York
City; if New York City residents have their blood tests performed outside the city, they will
not be included in the registry. Id.
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" The medical record number if known, identification number or code
assigned to the diabetic, if any, and other personal identifiers as may
be required by NYCDOHMH.
" The name and address of the physician or clinical laboratory who
submitted the blood specimen.
"* The name and address of the clinical laboratory which performed the
test.
"* The date the test results were first available.
"* The name(s) of any other tests performed in addition to the AIC
test.23
3. Implementation of the Diabetes Registry
New York City stores all the data required by Article 13 in the AIC
registry.24 The city hopes to use this data as a tool in learning to control
diabetes and other related diseases.25 The number of diabetic residents in
New York City has doubled in the past ten years, and diabetes is now the
fourth-leading cause of death in the city.26 Studies indicate that diabetics
who control their AIC levels may lessen their risk of small blood vessel
complications (e.g., eye disease, kidney disease, and peripheral nerve
disorders). 27 Additionally, a well-managed AIC level may "significantly
reduce [a diabetic's] risk of microvascular complications, visual loss,
stroke, heart failure, and diabetes-related death.",
28
While New York City's objective of controlling the diabetes epidemic is
commendable, the scope of the initiative currently is quite limited. The
NYCDOHMH has only three staff members and $950,000 annually
dedicated to controlling diabetes.29 Moreover, diabetics who use a home
23. Id.
24. See id.
25. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 n. 1(2003-2006).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Diana K. Berger et al., Diabetes Prevention and Management, 24 CITY HEALTH
INFORMATION 1, 2 (Jan. 2005), available at http://home2.nyc.gov/htmI/doh/downloads/
pdf/chi/chi24-1.pdf [hereinafter Berger et al., Diabetes Prevention and Management]. See
also RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 (2003-2006).
29. Robert Steinbrook, Facing the Diabetes Epidemic-Mandatory Reporting of
Glycosylated Hemoglobin Values in New York City, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 545, 548 (2006).
4 [Vol. 17
Whose Business is Your Pancreas?
test will not be part of the registry.30 The city is aware of this problem, but
estimates that the registry will capture the test results of eighty to ninety-
five percent of the city's diabetics.31 The city has an obvious interest in
helping its residents learn to manage their own diabetes, and in fact has
described individual patient meal planning, physical activity, blood glucose
monitoring, and diabetes education as the keys to controlling diabetes.32
Effective diabetes management will also help the city reach other patients
who require health care. The United States currently spends ten percent of
its healthcare dollars caring for diabetics (approximately $132 billion
annually).33 The more diabetics learn to care for themselves, the less
money the government needs to spend caring for them.
New York City's Health Commissioner, Thomas Frieden, envisions the
AIC registry as playing a critical role in controlling diabetes among city
residents.34 According to Frieden, the "knowledge [obtained from the AIC
registry] should be very powerful for assessing how we are doing on a
population basis and in reaching out to doctors and, through doctors
wherever possible, to their patients to provide more support." 35 The city
intends to use registry data to evaluate trends and:
"* Plan programs in the Diabetes Prevention and Control Program;
"* Measure outcomes of diabetes care, and thereby;
"* Direct more efficient interventions to health care institutions,
36health care providers and people with diabetes.
The cornerstone of the registry plan is a notification system. Although
the city intends eventually to install a city-wide notification program, it will
initially implement the program only in the South Bronx.37  Forty-eight
thousand adults in the South Bronx have been diagnosed with diabetes, and
twelve thousand of those adults are estimated to have an AIC level of
30. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.03 (2003-2006).
31. Steinbrook, supra note 29, at 547.
32. Berger et al., Diabetes Prevention and Management, supra note 28, at 2.
33. Id. at 1.
34. See Steinbrook, supra note 29, at 546.
35. Id.
36. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 n. 1 (2003-2006).
37. Letter from Thomas R. Frieden, Commissoner of the New York Department of
Health and Mental Hygiene, to Health Care Professionals (May/June 2006),
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/csi/diabeteskit-letter.pdf (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
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greater than nine percent. 38  The city plans to provide South Bronx
physicians with a quarterly roster of their diabetic patients (stratified
according to their patients' AIC level), along with recommendations for
controlling patients' diabetes. 39 The city may also notify the patient of his
deteriorating diabetic condition if his glycosylated hemoglobin value is
above a certain level, and provide that individual with helpful information
for alleviating high AIC levels. 40 Diabetics may opt out of receiving such
information by submitting a "Do Not Contact" request to the city,41 but in
the case of a diabetic minor, the city nonetheless may send the notice to the
minor's parent or guardian.42
The medical community's reaction to the registry has been mixed. Many
in the medical community believe that the notification system will provide
an important service to diabetic patients.43 Columbia University professor
of sociomedical studies Amy Fairchild, for example, endorsed the program
as a kind of "soft paternalism" that merely tries to help people who cannot
or will not help themselves.44 Those who support the registry often find the
city's plan to provide doctors with a chart of their diabetic patients'
progress (or regress) as particularly beneficial, because the ability to track
changes may be an important tool for doctors in developing treatment
strategies for their patients.45 Supporters also believe that the city's plan to
mail test results directly to patients will help drive home the importance of
managing their blood sugar levels.46
Conversely, others in the medical community are concerned that the
registry could infringe upon patient privacy. For example, while the ADA
38. Steinbrook, supra note 29, at 547.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, The New York City
AIC Registry, http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/html/diabetes/diabetes-nycar.shtml (last
visited Nov. 14, 2007).
42. Steinbrook, supra note 29, at 548.
43. See Letter from David M. Keepnews, Director, Office of Policy Development, New
York Academy of Medicine, to Thomas R. Frieden, Commissioner, New York City
Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, 1 (Aug. 15, 2006) (on file with the New York
City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene). See also Public Hearing on the Notice of
Intention to Amend Article 13 of the New York City Health Code (Aug. 16, 2005)
(statements by Maria Pitaro, Associate Medical Director of UNITE Health Center)
(transcript available at the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene).
44. See Amy Fairchild, Diabetes and Disease Surveillance, 313 SCIENCE 175, 176
(2006).
45. Letter from David M. Keepnews, supra note 43, at 1.
46. See DIANA K. BERGER & LYNN D. SILVER, N.Y. CITY DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
MENTAL HYGIENE, IMPROVING DIABETES CARE FOR ALL NEW YORKERS (2005),
http://home2.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/diabetes/diabetes-presentation-al c-registry.pdf
(noting that only ten percent of diabetics in New York know their AIC level).
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endorses the "idea of helping people with diabetes better manage their
disease," it is also concerned that personal patient information may not
remain private.47  The American Clinical Laboratory Association
("ACLA") has also expressed concern about the privacy of patients amidst
the city's intrusion into the patient-doctor relationship.48 Additionally, it
questioned the necessity of reporting personal information for non-
infectious diseases, doubted the Health Department's ability to utilize the
massive amount of information the program will generate, and argued that
the registry will aggravate the problem of escalating health care costs. 49 For
example, the ACLA pointed out that the language of the Health Code, if
taken literally, requires labs to report information that they may not have,
such as the address of the patient.50 This will substantially increase the
workload for lab personnel, as they will frequently be required to contact
doctors to obtain missing information. 51  The additional labor will
undoubtedly result in increased costs for the labs-costs that they may pass
on, at least partially, to consumers. The American Medical Association
("AMA") has not released an official statement commenting on the
program.
B. History of Public Health Registries
To understand the novel aspects of the new registry more fully, we
briefly sketch the evolution of public health monitoring. Governments and
public health officials have long struggled to protect their citizens from
health crises, and over the past century monitoring of and intervention
against specific diseases have become central features of public health
systems in most developed countries. 52  Registry systems designed to
collect detailed data enabling governments to track and prevent dangerous
diseases are one of the most widely-used forms of government
monitoring.
53
47. Rob Stein, New York City Starts To Monitor Diabetics, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2006,
at A3.
48. Letter from JoAnne Glisson, Senior Vice President, American Clinical Laboratory
Association, to Rena Bryant, Secretary to the New York City Board of Health, 3 (Aug. 16,
2005), http://www.clinical-labs.org/documents/A 1 cComment.pdf.
49. Id. at 2-4.
50. Seeid. at 1.
51. Id. at2.
52. Beate Ritz et al., Can Lessons from Public Health Disease Surveillance Systems Be
Applied to Environmental Public Health Tracking, 113 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 243, 243-44
(2005).
53. See Benedict C. Nwomeh et al., History and Development of Trauma Registry:
Lessons From Developed to Developing Countries, WORLD J. EMERGENCY SURGERY, Oct.
2006, at 1. See, e.g., National Committee on Vital Health Statistics, Frequently Asked
2008] 7
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The vast majority of public health registries in the past century have
focused on collection of infectious disease data. In the United States, for
example, Congress authorized the Bureau of Census in 1902 to collect vital
statistics data relating to diseases such as yellow fever, cholera, and small
pox. 54 A decade later, Congress expanded the powers of the Federal Public
Health Service by sanctioning investigations into tuberculosis, hookworm,
malaria, and leprosy and their relationship to socioeconomic factors such as
inadequate water supply and sewage disposal.55 When instances of
infectious diseases such as diphtheria, smallpox, or polio occurred, officials
placarded the homes of the infected or published daily lists in local
newspapers of the names and addresses of individuals afflicted with such
diseases. 56  During the second half of the twentieth century, aggressive
programs mandated tracking, screening and immunization for infectious
diseases, including tuberculosis, measles, mumps, rubella, diphtheria, and
polio.
57
The middle of the twentieth century also witnessed the creation and
expansion of state cancer registries. In 1939, New York was one of the first
states to begin collecting information on cancer diagnoses, though the
program initially excluded New York City. 58 The cancer registry, which
began as a simple reporting of tumor diagnoses, has expanded in scope such
that more than one hundred discrete pieces of information, including race,
gender, place of birth, and ethnicity are now collected for each individual.59
Currently, the New York cancer registry participates in the National
Program of Cancer Registries, a federally funded and standardized network
of state cancer registries that share data through the Center for Disease
Control and Prevention.6 As with infectious disease registries, a major
Questions About Medical and Public Health Registries, http://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/
9701138b.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
54. National Library of Medicine, Images from the History of Public Health Service,
Introduction: Two Centuries of Health Promotion, Jan. 27, 2005, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/
exhibitionl/phs-history/intro.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
55. Id.
56. Amy Fairchild et al., Public Goods, Private Data: HIV and the History, Ethics, and
Uses of Identifiable Public Health information, 122 PUB. HEALTH REP. 1, 8 (2007)
[hereinafter Fairchild et al., Public Goods, Private Data].
57. See, e.g., Scott F. Wetterhall et al., The Role of Public Health Surveillance:
Information for Effective Action in Public Health, 41 MMWR Suppl. 207, 209 (Dec. 1992).
See also Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Achievements in Public Health, 1900-
1999: Control of Infectious Diseases, 48 MMWR 621, 624 (July 30, 1999).
58. New York Department of Health, About the New York Cancer Registry, Feb. 2007,
http://www.health.state.ny.us/statistics/cancer/registry/about.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
59. Id.
60. Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, National Program of Cancer Registries,
June 21, 2007, http://www.cdc.gov/cancer/npcr (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
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goal of the cancer registry was to identify and control environmental,
occupational, and lifestyle factors that may contribute to higher cancer rates
in different populations.61 The cancer registries, however, did not assess
treatment in specific cases, but sought rather to study incidence of the
disease on a broader scale and attempt to correlate such statistics with social
and environmental trends.62
As the government became ever more involved in monitoring and
regulating public health, concerns for autonomy and privacy increased.63
Two distinct sides formed in the debate over the government's authority to
supervise and dictate treatment for public health matters: many Americans
increased their demand for governmental monitoring and the protections
they believed would follow, while others opposed mandatory collection of
medical data as an invasion of the traditional right of voluntary consent
prior to use of private medical data.64 Many feared that individually
identifiable registry data would be used to disadvantage parties with
infectious diseases, particularly diseases such as AIDS, which frequently
provoked condemnation from the general public.65  Although health
officials generally stressed the confidentiality of disease registries, this
confidentiality had limits. 66 The AMA Code of Medical Ethics has already
acknowledged that "peculiar circumstances" could limit protection of
confidentiality; in response to an increased emphasis on public knowledge,
the AMA expanded its ethical code to recognize a duty to the general
community.6' As a result, health officials began to release the names and
addresses of those with contagious diseases when deemed necessary to
fulfill the officials' duty to warn the public.68
The controversies developing over the past fifty or more years have been
animated by a deep divide between those who believe that the
government's responsibility to protect public health warrants extensive use
of individual data, and those whose notions of privacy and individual rights
demand strict limitations on the government's collection and use of
individual medical data.69 Even those who take the side of government
intervention, however, justify such intrusion by citing the overwhelming
61. New York Department of Health, supra note 58.
62. Id.
63. Fairchild et al., Public Goods, Private Data, supra note 56, at 8.
64. Id. at 9. See also AMY L. FAIRCHILD, HISTORY AND HEALTH POLICY IN THE UNITED
STATES-PUTTING THE PAST BACK IN 125-26 (Stevens et al., eds., Univ. of Cal. Press 2006).
65. Fairchild et al., Public Goods, Private Data, supra note 56, at 7, 9.
66. Id. at 8.
67. Id. See also Robert M. Gellman, Prescribing Privacy: The Uncertain Role of the
Physician in the Protection of Patient Privacy, 62 N.C. L. REV. 255, 268-69 (1982).
68. Fairchild et al., Public Goods, Private Data, supra note 56, at 8.
69. Id. at 9.
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need to halt the spread of infectious diseases or root out environmental and
occupational health risks that pose serious threat to the surrounding
community. 70  The suggestion that the government has any role in
regulating individual cases of noninfectious disease is far more
controversial, and New York City's diabetes registry is the first
noninfectious disease registry in the United States to mandate collection of
individual testing data in order to study the effectiveness of current
treatment. 71
Although diabetes registries have become more prevalent in the past
decade, these registries bear important distinctions from the New York City
plan. The Vermont Diabetes Information System ("VDIS"), for example,
sponsored by the National Institutes of Health,72 is the most renowned
active diabetes registry and care system in the United States. Much like the
New York registry (which in fact claims the VDIS as its inspiration),73 the
VDIS is primarily intended to improve adult diabetes treatment by
monitoring patients closely, testing frequently, and discovering new
information for advancing diabetes management by providing researchers
with access to collected data.74 Unlike the New York registry, however, the
VDIS relies entirely on voluntary enrollment from hospitals and primary
care practices,75 and allows patients to opt out of participation in the
registry altogether by calling a toll-free number.76 The VDIS has also
emphasized protecting patient data from questionable secondary uses. 77 For
example, when registry officials wanted to analyze links between diabetes
and socioeconomic characteristics, such as health education, literacy, and
alcohol abuse,78 the officials allowed researchers to obtain such personal
70. Id. at 11.
71. NYC Starts Diabetes Registry: Mandatory Monitoring Diabetes Treatment in New
York City, THE LANCET, Jan. 21, 2006, available at http://www.natap.org/2006/HIV/
012506603.htm.
72. Press Release, University of Vermont, UVM Study Aims to Improve Diabetes
Outcomes Statewide (Apr. 6, 2004), http://list.uvm.edu/cgi-bin/wa?A2-ind0404&L=
uvmnews&T=0&P=299.
73. NYC Starts Diabetes Registry, supra note 71. See also Steinbrook, supra note 29, at
547.
74. Charles D. MacLean et al., Diabetes Decision Support: Initial Experience with the
Vermont Diabetes Information System, 96 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 593, 593 (2006).
75. Id. at 594.
76. Benjamin Littenberg & Charles MacLean, Passive Consent for Clinical Research in
the Age of HIPAA, 21 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 207, 209 (Mar. 2006) [hereinafter Littenberg
& MacLean, Passive Consent for Clinical Research].
77. Id. at 208.
78. Benjamin Littenberg & Charles MacLean, Intra-cluster Correlation Coefficients in
Adults with Diabetes in Primary Care Practices. the Vermont Diabetes Information System
Field Survey, 6 BMC MED. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 20 (May 3, 2006), available at
http://www.pubmedcentral.nih.gov/articlerender.fcgi?artid= 1513389.
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information only after obtaining additional voluntary written consent from
the registry patient whose data were subject to analysis.79
European diabetes registries also bear notable differences from the New
York plan. The Belgian Diabetes Registry ("BDR"), for example, which
registers and tracks nearly every new diabetes case in patients under forty
years old in the entire country of Belgium, 80 relies on voluntary reporting of
all diabetes diagnoses by participating physicians.81 Although the registry
is primarily designed as a means for researchers to identify genetic,
environmental, and sociological risk factors for development of diabetes,
follow-up patient participation in the registry program (and further study by
physicians and researchers) may take place only after affirmative consent
from the patient.82
Similarly to the BDR, the Skaraborg Diabetes Registry ("SDR"), created
in 1991 in Skaraborg County, Sweden, established Sweden's first
comprehensive diabetes registry system by tracking nearly all recorded
incidents of diabetes in the entire county of Skaraborg (population
280,000).83 Although the SDR mandates that all diabetic patients enroll,
registry information is used only for purposes of aggregate data collection,84
and any personal data or further contact with a patient depends upon
affirmative consent from the patient. 85 The SDR is primarily intended to
estimate the prevalence of diabetes in the general population and study the
effects of insulin treatment on adult diabetics.
8 6
As the examples above demonstrate, the New York City plan operates
very differently from historic public health registries. While governments
have often mandated registry and treatment in the case of infectious
diseases, such infringement on personal choice and privacy has been
justified by the overriding need to protect the public from the spread of
79. Id.
80. Belgian Diabetes Registry, Homepage, http://www.bdronline.be/index.php?n=55
&id=55&taal=E (last visited Nov. 14, 2007) (translated from the original French).
81. Ilse Weets et al., The Incidence of Type I Diabetes in the Age Group 0-39 Years has
not Increased in Antwerp (Belgium) Between 1989 and 2000, 25 DIABETES CARE 840, 841
(2002).
82. Belgian Diabetes Registry, Projects, http://www.bdronline.be/index.php?n=41
&id=41&taal=E (last visited Nov. 14, 2007) (translated from the original French).
83. Gunnar Stenstr6m et al., HLA-DQ Genotypes in Classic Type I Diabetes and in
Latent Autoimmune Diabetes of the Adult, 156 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 787, 788 (2002).
84. See Bo Berger et al., The Prevalence of Diabetes in a Swedish Population of
280,411 Inhabitants, 21 DIABETES CARE 546, 546 (1998) [hereinafter Berger et al., The
Prevalence of Diabetes].
85. See id. See also Stenstr6m et al., supra note 83, at 787.
86. Berger et al., The Prevalence of Diabetes, supra note 84, at 546. See also Stenstr6m
et al., supra note 83, at 788.
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dangerous disease. 87  Cancer registries, on the other hand, have been
motivated largely by the desire to identify and mitigate environmental and
occupational risks, and as such focus on external factors rather than
targeting the individual patient.88 The few registries that are already in
place for diabetes, rather than mandating enrollment, rely on patient and
doctor consent, or at the least avoid collecting identifiable individual data
except by patient consent.89 A program such as New York's diabetes
registry, which mandates individual enrollment in a noninfectious disease
registry and records and uses individual data for tracking and treatment
purposes, raises potential legal and ethical concerns that merit thorough
discussion.
PART II-LEGAL AND ETHICAL PROBLEMS OF DIABETES REGISTRIES
This section explores the legal and ethical issues raised by New York
City's mandatory diabetes registry. A diabetic's AIC level is generally
confidential information, known only to the physician and patient.
Including such information in the registry, however, may lead to wider
disclosure of what was previously private information. Despite the
regulatory pledge of confidentiality, information in the database may be
disclosed to third parties through litigation, public health research,
misdirected notifications to physicians and patients, or sloppy handling by
public health officials. 90 Moreover, some patients may object to secondary
use of their information in research projects of which they disapprove.
Individuals subject to the registry may also face the prospect of limited
insurance options if required to disclose their AIC status to insurance
companies.9' Finally, physicians may also suffer if the registry information
is disclosed in response to a public health investigation or lawsuit. These
privacy problems are not yet endemic, but the potential for invasions is not
unrealistic, and the loopholes for such invasions should be closed.
A. Legality of Registries
Some state registries of health information have been challenged by
patients as an unjustifiable invasion of privacy. However, both the New
87. Fairchild et al., Public Goods, Private Data, supra note 56, at 8.
88. New York Department of Health, supra note 58.
89. Littenberg & MacLean, Passive Consent for Clinical Research, supra note 76, at
208; Belgian Diabetes Registry, Projects, supra note 82; Stenstr6m et al., supra note 83, at
787.
90. FAM. CT. ACT, N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2007);
People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1979); Steinbrook, supra note 29, at 546.
91. See WILLIAM R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE 372 (3d. ed., West
Publishing Co. 1951).
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York Court of Appeals in the case of Schulman v. New York City Health &
Hospital Corporation and the United States Supreme Court, in Whalen v.
Roe, upheld the creation of public health registries.92  In both cases, the
courts used a rational basis standard of review, 93 and found that the statutes
at issue advanced legitimate state interests. 94 The legality of such registries
has not been challenged since these two cases were decided in the 1970s.
In subsequent cases involving other uses of medical information, courts
have consistently held that such use implicates a right to privacy under the
Constitution. 95
Schulman involved a section of the New York City Health Code that
required hospitals to file a special report listing each patient's name and
address with the NYCDOHMH after any abortion procedure. 96 The New
York Court of Appeals reasoned that the state's interest in assuring "safe
and adequate facilities and procedures in abortions subject to governmental
regulation" made the law legitimate. 97 In Whalen, individuals challenged a
New York statute that required the names, addresses, and prescription
details for all persons receiving Schedule II medication prescriptions to be
reported to the Department of Health, which stored the information in a
computerized database. 98 In this case, the court held that the registry's
92. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1977); Schulman v. N.Y.C. Health & Hosp.
Corp., 342 N.E.2d 501, 507 (N.Y. 1975).
93. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 597-98; Schulman, 342 N.E.2d at 506-07. But see Doe v.
Poritz, 662 A.2d 367, 406 (N.J. 1995) (applying an intermediate standard of review).
94. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598; Schulman, 342 N.E.2d at 504.
95. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th
Cir. 1998) (holding nonconsensual medical testing of employees by state-run institution
implicated right to privacy under U.S. Constitution); Middlebrooks v. State Bd. of Health,
710 So. 2d 891, 892 (Ala. 1998) (state law requiring doctors to report cases of certain health
conditions, including AIDS, to the state board of health did not violate the constitutionally-
protected right to privacy; applying factors from United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
638 F.2d 570, 578 (3d Cir.1980)). But see Jessica Ansley Bodger, Taking the Sting out of
Reporting Requirements: Reproductive Health Clinics and the Constitutional Right to
Informational Privacy, 56 DUKE L.J. 583, 600 (2006) ("The Sixth, Eighth, and District of
Columbia Circuits do not recognize a constitutional right to informational privacy."); Joel
Glover & Erin Toll, The Right to Privacy of Medical Records: Balancing Competing
Expectations, 79 DENy. U. L.REv. 540, 542-43 (2002). See also J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d
1080, 1089 (6th Cir. 1981) ("[W]e are unable to see how such a constitutional right of
privacy can be restricted to anything less than the general 'right to be let alone"'); Am.
Fed'n Gov't Employees v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C. Cir.
1997) ("The Supreme Court has addressed the issue [of a right to privacy] in recurring dicta
without, we believe, resolving it.").
96. Schulman, 342 N.E.2d at 236.
97. Id. at 243. See also Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80
(1976) (holding that state abortion reporting requirements "that are reasonably directed to
the preservation of maternal health and that properly respect a patient's confidentiality and
privacy are permissible").
98. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 592-94.
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purpose to "aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse
of dangerous drugs" amounted to a legitimate state interest that took
precedence over individual patients' privacy concerns. 99
Furthermore, the courts in these cases further found no violation of a
constitutional right to privacy or autonomy in either statute, basing such
finding in part on two factors. First, neither statute interfered with decision-
making by patients or doctors, but merely required reporting of actions
already taken."00 Second, both statutes included express confidentiality
provisions protecting patient information from public disclosure. 101
The AIC registry's purpose is arguably distinguishable, because it is not
being used to monitor for criminal behavior, as with the prescription
registry in Whalen, nor is it being used to track the safety of a medical
procedure, as in Schulman. Rather, the AIC registry will be used to
supervise the non-criminal behavior of private citizens, namely, how well
diabetics are managing their own blood sugar levels.
Despite these differences, in light of Whalen and Schulman it is likely
that New York City's AIC registry would survive a constitutional
challenge.'0 2 Like the statutes at issue in both Whalen and Schulman, §
13.04 of New York City's Health Code does not directly interfere with
patient or physician decision-making. Additionally, § 13.04(d) contains a
brief confidentiality provision that limits disclosure to the patient, the
medical provider and, in the case of minors, the patient's parents or
guardians.10 3 Thus § 13.04 satisfies the factors that the courts in Whalen
and Schulman considered in determining the constitutionality of those
registries. Further, a detailed statement of the basis and purpose of the
registry, which would almost certainly support the rational basis of the
statute, was published in the city record.10 4
B. Potentialfor Disclosure Despite Statutory Confidentiality
Diabetics have reason to fear disclosure of personal information
contained in the AIC registry. Diabetes is an expensive and potentially
99. Id. at 598.
100. Id. at 603; Schulman, 342 N.E.2d at 240-41.
101. Whalen, 429 U.S. at 602; Schulman, 342 N.E.2d at 244.
102. See also Rollins v. Ulmer, 15 P.3d 749, 749 (Alaska 2001) (upholding
constitutionality of medical marijuana registry on grounds that the scheme assured
confidentiality, at least on its face, and assuming that the measure rationally allowed for
compliance with rules regulating marijuana use); Ark. Dep't of Human Serv. v. Heath, 848
S.W.2d 927, 928 (Ark. 1993) (holding that registry for unsubstantiated allegations of child
abuse is permissible).
103. See RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04(d) (2003-
2006).
104. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 n. 1 (2003-2006).
14 [Vol. 17
Whose Business is Your Pancreas?
debilitating disease to which myriad public myths and misconceptions still
attach. As a result, diabetics often face discrimination at work, in school,
and even in prison.10 5 As one diabetic man stated, "I was regarded as a
damaged piece of meat.. . . It was like, 'You're one of those, and we can't
have one of those.""0 06 Numerous lawsuits have claimed that employers,
school officials, and others denied diabetics fair opportunities in work and
school.10 7 Some diabetics have faced difficulty when requesting simple
accommodations to allow them to deal with their disease on the job. For
example, according to a New York Times article, a diabetic bank employee
in Oregon who needed to eat at her desk in order to keep her blood sugar in
check was refused permission to do so, and an insulin-dependent worker in
a Wisconsin candy company was fired after asking where to dispose of her
hypodermic needles.'0 8
Discrimination against diabetics is often the result of a fear that faintness
caused by a sudden drop in blood sugar-experienced by a few diabetics-
poses a safety risk to others. The San Antonio Police Department, for
example, imposed a blanket rule disqualifying any applicants who were
insulin-dependent until one such applicant sued to enforce his right to be
individually assessed as a safety risk under federal law.10 9 Until 2003,
insulin-dependent diabetics were not allowed to obtain commercial driver's
licenses because aggregate data suggested that they are more likely to be
involved in accidents." 0 Similarly, until 2006, the National Fire Protection
Association did not recommend hiring insulin-dependent diabetics."'
Confidentiality requirements in the New York City diabetes statute
circumscribe the city's disclosure of registry data. The AIC registry
confidentiality provision states that test results and identifying information
will only be available to the test subject and that person's medical
provider." 2  Given that confidentiality provisions in other New York
registries are rarely absolute, one could infer that the drafters purposely
105. American Diabetes Association, Legal Advocacy at ADA,
http://www.diabetes.org/advocacy-and-legalresources/discrimination/advocacy.jsp (last
visited Nov. 14, 2007).
106 N. R. Kleinfield, Diabetics in the Workplace Confront a Tangle of Laws, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 26, 2006, at 1.
107. See American Diabetes Association, Employment Cases Dealing with
Discrimination on the Basis of Diabetes, Aug. 11, 2006, http://www.diabetes.org/
uedocuments/CaseList0806.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
108 Kleinfield, supra note 106, at 1.
109. Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 304 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2002).
110. American Diabetes Association, Frequently Asked Questions About Commercial
Driver's Licenses, http://www.diabetes.org/advocacy-and-legalresources/discrimination/
CDLFAQ.jsp (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
Ill. Kleinfield, supra note 106, at 1.
112. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 (2003-2006).
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removed any mention of exceptions to the confidentiality requirement in the
diabetes registry statute. On its face, therefore, the provision is absolute,
brooking no exceptions.
The Health Insurance Portability Act of 1996 ("HIPAA") regulations are
also aimed at limiting the disclosure of a patient's individually-identifiable
medical information ("IIM")." 3 The HIPAA regulations, however, do not
prohibit NYCDOHMH from collecting patient information and using it for
research. The regulations prevent "covered entities" like health plans,
health care clearinghouses, and health care providers from disclosing a
patient's JIM without their consent.'14 The covered entities, however, are
exempted from seeking patients' consent when the covered entities are
disclosing their JIM to a public health authority for the purpose of
conducting public health surveillance, public health investigations, and
public health interventions.' 5 HIPAA regulations define public health
authority as "an agency or authority of the United States, a State, a territory,
a political subdivision of a State or territory, or an Indian tribe, or a person
or entity acting under a grant of authority from or contract with such public
agency ... that is responsible for public health matters as part of its official
mandate."1 1 6 NYCDOHMH claims to be a hybrid entity that has a health
care provider component and a public health authority component." 7
Courts are likely to view part of NYCDOHMH as a public health authority
because NYCDOHMH is responsible for public health matters in New
York City. Therefore, the NYCDOHMH public health authority component
correctly claims to be exempted from seeking patients' consent for
collecting their IIM for conducting public health surveillance. Moreover,
because NYCDOHMH claims to be a public health authority, HIPAA does
not require public health providers to seek the patient's consent for
disclosing the patient's IIM to NYCDOHMH. Additionally, the HIPAA
regulations do not require the NYCDOHMH to seek patients' consent
before using their IIM for research purposes as long as the NYCDOHMH
seeks approval from its institutional review board ("IRB") or a privacy
board." 8 In giving approval, the board weighs the patient's privacy interest
113. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514 (2006).
114. See id. § 164.506.
115. See id. § 164.512.
116. See id. § 164.501.
117. New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, Notice of Privacy 1,
Apr. 14, 2003, http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/public/hipaa.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2007).
118. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(1)(i) (2007).
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against the importance of the research and the steps taken to minimize the
risks to the patient's privacy.
1 9
1. Potential for Use in Legal Proceedings
Doubt remains, however, as to the unqualified nature of the New York
City diabetes registry's confidentiality. First, in the case of health records
regarding highly sensitive information such as AIDS or sexually
transmissible diseases, the city has taken care explicitly to forbid subpoena
of such confidential information for use in court proceedings.12 0 The New
York City Health Code provision stating that such information "shall not be
subject to subpoena" has been interpreted by the New York Court of
Appeals as providing absolute confidentiality.' 21 The diabetes registry, on
the other hand, lacks such an explicit provision, and therefore the
unconditional nature of its protection against subpoena is questionable.1
22
Family law proceedings are one context in which the confidentiality of
information in the diabetes registry might be breached. Due to their closed
nature and the paramount state interest in children's safety and well-being,
such proceedings allow for use of evidence inadmissible in other judicial
contexts.123 Physician-patient privileges, psychologist-client privileges, and
related confidentiality provisions do not apply to child protective
proceedings initiated under the New York Family Court Act. 124 Courts
have also bypassed statutory evidentiary rules, permitting admission of
evidence which in other contexts would be barred by the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule.125 If courts or legislators determine that the
new A IC Registry confidentiality provision should be waived in the same
manner as physician-patient and other privileges, family law proceedings
could be directly impacted.
Information in the AIC registry may be directly relevant in a family law
proceeding. Because family law courts have used diabetes as a factor
against the "fitness" of a parent in neglect, termination, and custody
hearings,' 26 it is plausible that a family law court would desire information
on an individual's AIC level. In at least one case, a court took diabetic
119. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i)(2)(ii)(A)-(C) (2007).
120. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 11.07(a)-(b) (2006).
121. In re Baker's Mut. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 92 N.E.2d 49, 50-51 (N.Y. 1950).
122. See RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 (2003-
2006).
123. In re Doe Children, 402 N.Y.S.2d 958, 959-60 (Fain. Ct. 1978).
124. FAM. CT. ACT, N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 1046(a)(vii) (McKinney 1999 & Supp.
2007).
125. See In re Cassandra R., 504 N.Y.S.2d 602, 603 (Farn. Ct. 1986).
126. See, e.g., In re W.N., 801 N.Y.S.2d 243 (Fam. Ct. 2005).
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status into account when deciding between two equally fit caregivers,
making an aunt's continuing custody of her nephew contingent on properly
managing her diabetes.' 27 Case law from various jurisdictions, including
New York, reveals that parental rights have also been terminated when
parents are unable to adhere to the treatment regimen prescribed for a
diabetic child.12
8
It is also conceivable that a violation of confidentiality might arise in the
context of a criminal proceeding, where a defendant could invoke his or her
Sixth Amendment right to confront a witness, permitting the defendant to
obtain the otherwise confidential information of a third party.'29 For
instance, a defendant might wish to impeach the testimony of a witness on
the ground that he or she was in diabetic shock at the time of the incident.
Although the risk that information from the diabetes registry could be
subject to subpoena seems slight, the lack of statutory language explicitly
prohibiting subpoena of registry information may result in disclosure of
information contained in the registry.
2. Disclosure of Private Information to Public Health Researchers
Despite the confidentiality provisions, New York public health
authorities may disclose private information to researchers. New York City
officials stated at the time the registry was established that the information
to be obtained would be invaluable in studying and preventing further
incidence of the disease.' 30  In order to formulate policies to limit the
increase in diabetes, public health officials must be able to assess AIC
trends in conjunction with other data. For example, child obesity has been
strongly linked to diabetes, and yet the registry data do not contain
information on weight. Health officials would need to review each
diabetic's medical file to get the type of information that would be
beneficial to understanding the course of the disease. Indeed, New York
authorities noted that they were modeling the city's approach on the
Vermont program, in which more data than mere AlC levels were
assessed. 131 It is thus reasonable to conclude that despite the confidentiality
provision, city officials may well intend to permit researchers to analyze
127. Florence B. v. Carol M., 576 N.Y.S.2d 981, 988-89 (Fam. Ct. 1991).
128. In re Mark R., No. B185475, 2005 WL 3418252, at *9 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 14,
2005); In re Brinkman, No. 259377, 2005 Mich. App. LEXIS 1204, at *2-4 (May 12, 2005);
Anna Mae B. v. Harold H., 488 N.Y.S.2d 112, 112, (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); In re John W.,
682 A.2d 930, 931-32 (R.I. 1996).
129. See, e.g., People v. Gissendanner, 399 N.E.2d 924 (N.Y. 1979).
130. See id. at n. 1. See also Steinbrook, supra note 29, at 546.
131. Littenberg & MacLean, Passive Consent for Clinical Research, supra note 76, at
208.
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personal information in order to develop a more comprehensive
understanding of and response to diabetes. The more people that have
access to personal information, the greater the chance for a breach of
privacy.
At the same time that New York City officials established the registry,
they announced a pilot program for notifications of elevated A1C levels to
patients and their physicians.' 32 The process of notification itself could
well violate the confidentiality provisions, because unless the process is
fully automated, someone other than the physician and patient will have to
work with the registry to ensure that proper notifications are sent. Each
successive notification would violate the literal terms of the regulation.' 33
If more than one address is on record, or a notification is returned, staff will
become involved to a greater extent. Therefore, the notification plan itself
strongly suggests that city authorities will not keep the information
completely confidential.
Private information in other medical registries has indeed been divulged
for a variety of reasons. For instance, a nationwide registry of DNA
samples in Sweden was established approximately thirty years ago for
medical purposes. Personally identifiable samples were supposed to be
used only with the consent of the person involved, but the Swedes were
dismayed to learn that the registry was used for forensic purposes in the
Anna Lindh murder investigation without their consent.' 34 The extent of
confidentiality pledged under the city scheme is similarly in question.
3. Inadvertent Disclosure of Private Information
Aside from those instances in which the city knowingly may allow
registry data to be disclosed, registry data may inadvertently be divulged to
unauthorized individuals, and potentially used for discriminatory or
otherwise wrongful purposes.
Because all of the AIC registry data is transferred and stored
electronically, the NYCDOHMH must guard against hackers who may
break into the AIC registry, whether for bragging rights or a desire to pass
on the data to the highest bidder. Keeping electronic data secure is a
challenge even for government agencies guarding top secret information.
Hackers have found their way into well guarded NASA, Pentagon, and
132. Frieden, supra note 37.
133. See RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 (2003-2006).
134. See Klaus Hoeyer, Biobanks and Informed Consent in Umed University Medical
Dissertations New Series No. 929, at 17 (Nov. 12, 2004) (on file with Umed University
Library), available at http://www.diva-portal.org/umu/theses/abstract.xsql?dbid=358. See
generally Claudia Mund, Biobanks-Data Sources without Limits? (Sept.15, 2005),
http://www.privacyconference2005.org/fileadmin/PDF/mund e.pdf.
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military installation databases.' 35 In other instances, agency employees
themselves have illegally sold the information for a small profit.'3 6 Hackers
similarly could likely find a market for the information they obtain.
Pharmaceutical companies, in particular, would find the information
beneficial in their research and marketing efforts.
Although New York City has promised confidentiality in its notification
program, the possibility remains that an AIC test notification could be
mishandled. At a minimum, staff must process the information to facilitate
notification. Thus, even if the registry database is itself secure, identifiable
information in the hands of staff (or researchers) will likely not be secure,
and no published protocols govern the security of information in staff
members' or researchers' hands. Inadvertent mistakes-whether because
of an unsecured database, misplaced laptop, or simply charts left lying
around-can occur. Moreover, the city's notifications may themselves be
delivered to the wrong address, raising the possibility that neighbors,
strangers, or even non-custodial parents could learn of an individual's AIC
results.
Because the city notifies parents of the Al C results for minor children,
there is also a possibility that the city will improperly send a notification to
the parents of minors who are entitled to keep their medical information
confidential from their parents. Under New York law, parents may access a
minor's medical records from a health care provider only where the parent
consented to the care or where emergency care was given without
consent.137 By contrast, individuals under eighteen who are themselves
married or parents have the right to consent to their own medical treatment,
and records of their treatment are confidential. 138 It is not apparent that the
city's procedures adequately protect the privacy rights of such minors. In
summary, private information under New York's scheme may be disclosed
to staff, to researchers, or to unintended third parties. The consequences of
such disclosure may be severe to diabetics.
4. Uses of Registry Information in Research Studies
Diabetics may also be concerned with the potential secondary uses of
epidemiological information in the registry, even if identifying information
135. John Leyden, Brit Charged with Hacking Pentagon, NASA, THE REGISTER, Nov.
13, 2002, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/11/13/brit_charged_with_hacking_
pentagon/.
136. Associated Press, Uh, Folks, Your Data was Swiped, WIRED, May 23, 2005,
available at http://www.wired.com/politics/security/news/2005/05/67616.
137. N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 18(2)(c) (McKinney 2007).
138. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2504(1) (McKinney 2007); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 4504(a)
(McKinney 2007).
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is removed. Reports collected under New York's regulatory scheme create
a treasure trove of information for both public health officials and
researchers alike. Researchers will be able to match AIC levels by
neighborhood and evaluate trends as the AIC levels dip or rise. Indeed, the
prospect for such epidemiological research in part prompted creation of the
diabetes registry.1 39  Diabetics, however, may object to use of their
information for such purposes.
The problem of secondary uses has long plagued the medical profession.
For example, members of the Havasupai Tribe permitted Arizona State
University's researchers to study potential causes of the tribe's high
diabetes rate, but the researchers used the group's medical records and
blood samples also to study schizophrenia, migration, and inbreeding in the
tribe.1 40 The tribe filed suit against the university asking for both damages
and an injunction to prevent further unauthorized use of the medical records
and samples. 14' In another case, Washington University v. Catalona, the
Eighth Circuit decided that tens of thousands of tissue samples collected for
prostate cancer research could be used by the collecting university for
unrelated purposes.142 Privacy advocates hope that these cases, and others
like them, will illustrate the danger that research subjects face in having
their private health information used in ways other than specifically
authorized. 1
43
Although the confidentiality provision governing the AIC registry does
not explicitly allow for disclosure of test results and information for use in
scientific and medical studies, there are reasons to believe that registry
information will be used for such purposes. Prior to New York City's
establishment of the AIC registry, the Diabetes Task Force of New York
State issued a "Strategic Plan for the Prevention of Diabetes" which
addressed the potential use of information contained in an AIC registry.1
44
The Task Force suggested that creating a diabetes registry would help
researchers assess the quality of care being provided to people with diabetes
and track the risk of diabetes associated with obesity.145 The Task Force
139. BERGER& SILVER, supra note 46.
140. Lori B. Andrews, Havasupai Tribe Sues Genetic Researchers, 4 LAW & BIOETHICS
REPORT 10, 10 (2004).
141. Id. (discussing Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. St. Univ., No. 3:04-CV-1494 (D.Ariz.
2004); Tilousi v. Ariz. St. Univ., No. 3:04-CV-1290 (D.Ariz. 2004); Tilousi v. Ariz. St.
Univ., No. 2:04-CV-1290 (D.Ariz. 2004)).
142. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 676-77 (8th Cir. 2007).
143. See Lori B. Andrews, supra note 140, at 10-11.
144. See MICHAEL A. ACOSTA ET AL., NEW YORK STATE STRATEGIC PLAN FOR THE
PREVENTION AND CONTROL OF DIABETES, http://www.health.state.ny.us/diseases/conditions/
diabetes/docs/stateplandiabetes.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
145. Id. at 15-16.
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explicitly addressed the potential for use of AIC registry information in
research studies when it set the goal of obtaining aggregate statistics to
track diabetes risk. 146 Such goals are only attainable if researchers conduct
additional studies with the inclusion of personal identifying information
such as weight. Even if all identifying characteristics can be removed, the
question remains whether diabetics should have a right to object to
particular research conducted based on information they involuntarily
provide to the registry.
Similar New York City registries have used database information for
further research purposes. The data obtained by the Child Blood Lead
Level Registry in New York, for example, is given to the Center for
Disease Control ("CDC"), which then uses the information in monitoring
the child blood lead level for the entire U.S. population.147 Among other
purposes, the aggregate statistics are used by the CDC to identify risk
groups.' 48 Aggregate data are grouped for reports based on age, ethnicity,
race, poverty level, and region of the country.' 49 Although the statutory
language controlling the Child Blood Lead Level Registry allows for more
general discretionary disclosure to a person or agency if the disclosure will
contribute to the protection of public health,"5° it is foreseeable that the AIC
database will be treated in a similar fashion because aggregate registry data
could provide important insights into optimal control of diabetes and its
risks."'
The New York State Cancer Registry, which tracks more than one
hundred pieces of information including race, gender, place of birth, and
146. Id.
147. Pamela A. Meyer et al., Surveillance for Elevated Blood Lead Levels Among
Children-United States, 1997-2001, Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, Sept. 12,




150. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit, 24, § 11.07(d) (2006)
(information obtained in both the Child Blood Lead Level Registry and the Immunization
Registry may be disclosed to a person or agency if the disclosure will contribute to the
protection of the public health).
151. ACOSTA ET AL., supra note 144, at 15. See also Diabetes in California Task Force,
California's Plan for Diabetes, 2003-2007, 7, http://www.caldiabetes.org/content_
display.cfm?contentlD=91&categorylD= 10 (last visited Oct. 23, 2007) (California already
uses epidemiological information obtained from diabetics in scientific and medical studies in
the California Diabetes Program); Division of Research at Kaiser Permanente, Diabetes
Registry, http://www.dor.kaiser.org/studies/diabetes/Diabetes-06.shtml (last visited Nov. 14,
2007) (the Kaiser Permanente insurance group maintains a registry of all residents with
diabetes in the Northern California region as part of the California Diabetes Registry, and
information in the registry has been used to facilitate a series of epidemiologic and health
service projects).
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ethnicity,152 also makes some registry information available to the public on
the Department of Health website, where visitors can track the prevalence
of different cancer types by county, borough, and neighborhood.' 53 The
availability of some information from the registry has led to public demand
for even more-researchers and breast cancer activists have demanded
release of information such as street-by-street and residence-by-residence
cancer incidence and detailed family and occupational histories.154
Diabetics may not realize that by checking their A 1C levels, they are also
exposing private information to researchers. One can imagine
characteristics in addition to obesity that would be of interest to researchers
to correlate with diabetes, such as race, age or occupation. As researchers
compare unique characteristics with diabetes, negative consequences for
diabetics may arise, including discrimination based on aggregate data and
the loss of privacy through revelation of identity or mistake.
Diabetics have experienced discrimination in the past 15 and are
vulnerable to additional discrimination resulting from conclusions produced
by epidemiological studies. In order to complete these studies, scientists
will need more information about diabetic patients. The AIC registry likely
will expand to encompass multiple other characteristics for such public
health studies in order to serve these research needs. The potential
conclusions of such studies could lead the public to believe that certain
characteristics are always indicative of high AIC levels and diabetes in
general, which could then lead to discrimination. Thus, even if the
identifying information in the AIC registry data remains confidential,
aggregate data may well have a tendency to create harmful presumptions
about the capabilities of diabetics. The tendency is even more problematic
for racial minorities in New York City, who are not only more than twice as
likely as whites to be diabetic, but are also more likely to have higher AIC
levels even if they are not diabetic.1
5 6
Full disclosure of all permissible research purposes should be made prior
to collection of the identifying characteristic information needed for studies
152. New York Department of Health, About the New York State Cancer Registry, Feb.
2007, http://www.health.state.ny.us/statistics/cancer/registry/about.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
153. New York Department of Health, New York State Cancer Registry, June 2007,
http://www.health.state.ny.us/statistics/cancer/registry (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
154. Joan Swirsky, State Cancer Map: One Step In the Search for the Cause, N.Y.
TiMES, Mar. 5, 2000, at Long Island Weekly Section.
155. See, e.g., Kleinfield, supra note 106 at 1; Kapche v. City of San Antonio, 304 F.3d
493, 493 (5th Cir. 2002).
156. Shona J. Kelly et al., Is Hemoglobin AIC Level Associated with Measures of Socio-
economic Status in Non-diabetics After Controlling for Known Explanatory Factors?, 21
STRESS & HEALTH 185, 187 (Apr. 14, 2005).
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such as those proposed by New York State's Diabetes Task Force. While
aggregate data created by the AIC registry could lead to important medical
findings, public health officials must also weigh potential benefits against
the possibility that aggregate data can produce unintended consequences-
such as stigmatization and economic discrimination-for the very people
the medical community is trying to help.
C. Impact on Insurance Coverage and Eligibility
Even apart from confidentiality concerns regarding the information in
New York's registry, AIC registry notifications may adversely affect a
patient's ability to obtain or retain health, disability, or life insurance. The
AlC registry notifications could potentially inform patients of unknown
and unsolicited information about their own health. Receipt of such health-
related information could in turn affect the patient's ability to obtain
insurance. 1
57
1. Effect of Notice on Patient's Knowledge
When a registry notice informs a patient of his unfavorable AIC level, it
is possible, but unlikely, that the notice will serve as the patient's first
notice that he has diabetes.' 58 The AIC test results typically will not be a
patient's first notice of diabetes because the AIC test is not the
recommended test for making an initial diabetes diagnosis.1 ' 9 Instead, AIC
tests are recommended for use periodically after the initial diagnosis to
assist with developing and monitoring a diabetes management plan, which
may include diet, exercise, and medication.'
60
157. In addition to insurability implications, other undesired consequences may also
flow from the use of individualized notifications. For example, the notification system
creates a massive marketing opportunity for pharmaceutical companies, raising the prospect
of unwanted junk mail for diabetics in New York City. With every notice mailed to
individuals, the City could-without violating its confidentiality code-enclose marketing
literature targeted to diabetics. The City could help fund the cost of the registry with fees
from drug companies, and the information could be helpful to some, though misleading to
others. How Advertising Affects Prescriptions, 22 Harvard Mental Health Letter, Issue 2,
August 2005, at 7. See also Richard L. Kravitz et al., Influence of Patients' Requests for
Director-to-Consumer Advertised Antidepressants: A Randomized Controlled Trial, 293 J.
Am. MED. ASS'N 1995 - 2002 (2005). Although the City has not announced any plan to
take advantage of this marketing opportunity, nothing in the code prevents it from doing so
in the future.
158. American Diabetes Association, AIC Test, supra note 6 (although the AIC test is
generally used to monitor blood sugar levels of diagnosed diabetics, doctors could use the
AIC test as an initial diagnosis, in which case a warning letter regarding high AIC levels
would serve as the patient's first notification that he has diabetes. Such a notification raises
important policy implications wholly separate from the insurability issue).
159. American Diabetes Association, Standards of Medical Care in Diabetes-2006, 29
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Registry notice of an unfavorable AlC level would most often notify
patients that their blood sugar levels have not been properly maintained.161
For the well-informed diabetes patient, warning of an unfavorable AlC
level will also serve as notice of a higher risk of diabetes complications.
Studies have shown a correlation between high A 1 C levels and an increased
risk of small blood vessel complications such as eye disease, kidney
disease, and peripheral nerve disorders.1
62
Despite the importance of AIC levels in monitoring blood sugar levels,
one New York City Health Department study found that only eleven
percent of people with diabetes in New York State were aware of their A l C
level.1 63  While registry notice of an unfavorable AIC level would be
unlikely to inform a patient of the fact of diabetes, it could provide patients
with information about their medical condition and future medical risks that
they may not otherwise have received.
2. Effect on Patient's Current Health Insurance Relationship
An AIC registry notification will not affect a patient's current
relationship with health insurance carriers. New York law provides
guaranteed renewability-a health insurer may not cancel an individual
policy because of the insured's change in health status.164 In addition, an
insurer would likely have access to AIC test results regardless of whether
that information is tracked in the registry.65 Health insurance companies
have broad rights to inspect medical information in order to evaluate
medical claims.' 66 Therefore, patients' subjective knowledge of their AIC
DIABETES CARE Supp. 1, S4, S4 (Jan. 2006).
160. Id. at S9 - S10; American Diabetes Association, AIC Test, supra note 6.
161. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 n. 1 (2003-2006)
(a patient who conducts regular home tests for current blood sugar level will already have
some idea of his AIC level, since the AIC test measures a patient's average blood sugar
level for the preceding 120 days).
162. Id.
163. L. E. Thorpe et al., Diabetes is Epidemic, 2 NYC VITAL SIGNS Vol. 2, 1-4 (Jan.
2003), available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/doh/downloads/pdf/survey/survey-2003diabetes.pdf
164. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3216(g)(1)(F) (McKinney 2007). But cf 29 U.S.C. §
I 144(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006) (noting that 'self-insurers,' or employers that pay employee health
care costs out of a fund that they set aside for that purpose, are not subject to state law under
ERISA).
165. American Diabetes Association, Commonly Asked Questions about Health
Insurance, http://www.diabetes.org/advocacy-and-legalresources/healthcare/healthinsurance/
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level or diabetic condition, gained from a registry notice, would not likely
impact their relationship with their current health insurer.
3. Effect on Ability to Obtain Health Insurance
On the other hand, a patient's enhanced subjective knowledge of his
medical condition can be relevant to his ability to obtain health insurance.
This section considers two relevant health insurance issues: medical
underwriting and pre-existing condition exclusions.
a. Medical Underwriting
Most states allow health insurance companies to engage in medical
underwriting. That is, health insurers can consider an applicant's health
condition, and the risk of insuring him or her, when deciding whether to
insure the applicant, how much to charge the applicant, and which benefits
to offer. 167 In many states, diabetes is a condition for which most medical
underwriters will automatically deny coverage.1 68 However, it should be
noted that employer sponsored group health insurance plans are subject to
consumer protection against individual underwriting.1 69  In these states,
health insurers will likely inquire about existing health conditions, and
applicants have a duty to disclose known circumstances that would
influence the insurer's decision in regards to their application.170  As a
result, an applicant's failure to disclose known material facts while
applying for such insurance may be sufficient grounds for the health insurer
later to cancel the policy. 171 Both a diagnosis of diabetes and an
unfavorable AIC level would be considered material facts pertinent to
insurance underwriters. 172
167. Karen Pollitz et al., Falling through the Cracks: Stories of How Health Insurance
Can Fail People with Diabetes, 8, Feb. 8, 2005, http://web.diabetes.org/Advocacy/
healthresearchreport0505 .pdf.
168. American Diabetes Association, Commonly Asked Questions, supra note 165.
169. American Diabetes Association, Employer-Sponsored Coverage,
http://www.diabetes.org/advocacy-and-legalresources/healthcare/healthinsurance/employer-
sponsored.jsp (last visited, Oct. 23, 2007) [hereinafter American Diabetes Association,
Employer-Sponsored Coverage].
170. See VANCE, supra note 91, at 372.
171. Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination
Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky. L. J. 503, 546 (1997).
172. See VANCE, supra note 91, at 372. Because some companies already use diabetes
information in their underwriting, New York City's AIC reporting requirement will not
overwhelmingly change these practices. However, the AIC registry may affect the ability of
persons with diabetes to obtain health insurance in less direct ways. New York's emphasis
on the AIC test in particular could cause insurance companies to place greater emphasis on
that data, especially if it becomes more readily available to them. Also, if diabetes is linked
to genetic transmission, insurance companies might plausibly use the existence of diabetes in
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However, New York law provides that residents cannot be refused an
individual or small group health insurance policy because of a health
condition.' 73 New York law also requires "community rating" of individual
and small group health insurance policies to ensure that residents cannot be
charged higher rates because of their health conditions.1 74  In addition,
patients in employer-provided group plans, which may not be controlled by
state law, receive similar protection under federal law.175 About half of
New York City residents have employer-provided health insurance plans;
the other half have individual plans, are insured through public programs,
or are uninsured.176 Under ERISA, employer provided plans are also not
allowed to turn down individuals or charge them more based on their health
status. 177
Because New York residents cannot be denied individual or group
insurance based on their health status, AIC notifications will not alter
patients' insurability by enhancing their knowledge of their condition or
even by informing them initially of their diabetes. Disclosure of A IC tests
therefore would not jeopardize health insurance coverage.
b. Pre-Existing Condition Exclusions
A second health insurance issue implicated by A1C notifications is
coverage for pre-existing conditions. Health insurance companies may seek
to limit their risk of liability by excluding coverage for pre-existing health
conditions. Such provisions are subject to state law requirements.'7 8
Under New York state law, health insurers may only exclude coverage
for certain pre-existing conditions: those for which medical advice,
diagnosis, care, or treatment was in fact recommended or received by the
covered person during the six months immediately preceding the
enrollment date.179 A health insurer may not exclude coverage based on
one individual to insist on higher premiums for other family members. This fear, however,
seems distant at best, both because the possibility of genetic links in diabetes is still largely
unknown, and because unfavorable AIC tests alone-the only testing information the NYC
registry explicitly measures-have an even more dubious connection to poor diabetes
management among family members. Id.
173. N.Y. INS. LAW § 323 1(a) (McKinney 2007).
174. Id.
175. American Diabetes Association, Employer-Sponsored Coverage, supra note 169.
176. Danielle Holahan et al., Health Insurance Coverage in New York, 2002, 3, May 3,
2004, http://www.uhfnyc.org/usr_doc/chartbook2004.pdf.
177. American Diabetes Association, Employer-Sponsored Coverage, supra note 169.
178. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A)-(B) (2006) (note, however, that 'self-insurers,' or
employers that pay employee health care costs out of a fund that they set aside for that
purpose, are not subject to state law under ERISA).
179. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3232(b) (McKinney 2006).
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pre-existing symptoms alone.1 80 The AIC notification is designed to
encourage recipients to seek and comply with medical advice, diagnosis,
care, or treatment. Thus, receipt of an AIC notification may make diabetes
a 'pre-existing condition' if it is the first such notice that an individual has
received.
As discussed above, it is unlikely that an AIC notification would serve
as a patient's first treatment recommendation, since the AIC test is
commonly administered only after diabetes is diagnosed. However, in
those cases in which the registry first alerts an individual to the need for
diabetes treatment, that individual could face significant costs under certain
new insurance policies. A new health insurer could refuse to cover the
costs of diabetes treatment for up to one year.181
4. Health Insurance and Employment Discrimination
Individuals with diabetes who obtain health insurance through their
employers are also at risk of losing insurance coverage because of
discrimination by their current or potential employers.' 82 Employment
discrimination against individuals with disabilities can be motivated by
concern for employee absence, poor performance, or by a desire to lower
the costs of providing insurance. 183 In recent years employers who provide
health insurance coverage for employees have faced increasing insurance
rates.' 84  Small business employers can be especially affected by high
insurance rates, since they usually do not benefit from the same discounted
group rates as larger employers, and because one sick employee can
substantially affect insurance rates for a small group of insured
employees.'8 5  Some employers throughout the U.S. have responded to
increasing insurance costs by firing employees or declining applicants with
180. Michael J. Camilleri & David J. Larkin, Jr., Regulation of Accident and Health
Insurers, BENDER'S N.Y. INS. LAW § 35.04 (Lawrence A. Kaplan ed., 1999) (citing Bunk v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 648 N.Y.S.2d 291 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996), aff'd as modified, 668
N.Y.S.2d 121 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996)).
181. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3232(b) (McKinney 2006) (individual and small group plans);
American Diabetes Association, Employer-Sponsored Coverage, supra, note 169; American
Diabetes Association, Direct and Indirect Costs of Diabetes in the United States,
http://www.diabetes.org/diabetes-statistics/cost-of-diabetes-in-us.jsp (last visited Oct. 23,
2007) ("The per capita annual costs of health care for people with diabetes rose from
$10,071 in 1997 to $13,243 in 2002, an increase of more than 30%").
182. See Kleinfield, supra note 106.
183. See id.
184. See Lisa Belkin, Sick and Vulnerable, Workers Fear for Health and Their Jobs,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2005, at Al.
185. Id.
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a high risk of medical costs, such as those with diabetes. 186 However, the
risk of such employment discrimination by a small business employer is
lessened in New York. State law requires insurers to use community rating
for small group health insurance plans. 187 Thus, New York protects small
businesses from suffering escalating insurance costs based on the medical
experience of a few of its employees.
Federal and state laws protect disabled individuals from employment
discrimination. The Americans with Disabilities Act ("Act") prohibits
employers from discriminating against qualified individuals with
disabilities by firing or refusing to hire them because of their disability.
1 88
However, the Act protects only certain impaired individuals: those with
physical or mental impairments that "substantially limit[] one or more...
major life activities," those with a history of such an impairment, and those
who have been regarded as having such an impairment.1 89 The question of
whether diabetes substantially limits major life activities is a factual
determination made on a case by case basis.190 Both New York State and
New York City also have laws prohibiting adverse employment actions
based on a disability. 191 The New York statutes provide greater protection
because they define "disability" broadly instead of limiting protection to
those impairments that substantially limit a major life activity.192
Additionally, prohibitions under New York State and city law apply to
employers with four or more employees, 193 while the Act applies only to
employers with fifteen or more employees. 194
Despite these protections, employment discrimination against individuals
186. See id. (relating experiences of employees who were fired after becoming seriously
ill). See also Milt Freudenheim & Robert Pear, Health Hazard: Computers Spilling Your
History, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2006, § 3, at 1 (describing risk of employment discrimination
resulting from electronic storage of medical data).
187. See N.Y. INS. LAW §3231(a) (McKinney 2007) (requiring community rating of
individual and small group plans); N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 11, § 360.2 (2001)
(defining small group plans as those covering between two and fifty member employees).
188. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12112(a) (West 2006).
189. 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102(2) (West 2006).
190. U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Questions and Answers about
Diabetes in the Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act, Oct. 29, 2003,
http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/diabetes.html.
191. See generally N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 290-21 (McKinney 2005); N.Y., N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 8, § 102 (2007).
192. See N.Y. EXEC. LAW §§ 292(21), 296(1)(d) (McKinney 2007) (defining disability
to include any medically diagnosable condition); N.Y., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 102(16)
(2007) (defining disability to include any "impairment of any system of the body").
193. N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 292(5) (McKinney 2007); N.Y., N.Y. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, §
102(5) (2007).
194. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1211 1(5)(A) (2006) (the Americans with Disabilities Act applies to
employers with fifteen or more employees).
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with diabetes persists.195 Although the AIC registry notifications are not
intended as notifications to employers, they could indirectly facilitate
employment discrimination. Employers who are aware of the AlC registry
might ask employees about whether they have received notifications or
whether they are aware of their Al C level. Employers may inappropriately
rely on AlC level data to determine whether to hire or retain an individual
instead of concentrating on whether they can satisfy the job requirements.'1 96
5. Effect on Ability to Obtain Life Insurance or Disability Insurance
As with health insurers in many states, life or disability insurance
companies can charge higher premiums or reject applicants based on
actuarial information.197 For a patient diagnosed with diabetes, life or
disability insurance can become considerably more expensive and
extremely difficult to obtain.198 AIC levels, which indicate how well a
patient is managing his diabetes, are a central factor for the life or disability
insurance company.' 99 As one insurance agent writes, disability insurance
companies are looking for "[c]ontrol, control, control!!!''2°0 An unfavorable
AIC level can be the deciding factor which precludes coverage or raises
premiums.2°'
195. See, e.g., Rubick v. Cattaraugus & Wyo. Counties Project Head Start, No. 00-CV-
0057E(F), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15402, at *12 (W.D.N.Y. Oct. 5, 2000); Arena v. Agip
U.S.A. Inc., No. 95 Civ. 1529, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2578, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2000);
DiPol v. N.Y. City Transit Auth., 999 F. Supp. 309, 315 (E.D.N.Y. 1998); Kelly v. Town of
N. Hempstead, 103 A.D.2d 767 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984).
196. See generally U.S. Equal Opportunity Employment Commission, The Americans
with Disabilities Act: A Primer for Small Business, Hiring Do's and Don'ts-Pre-Job Offer,
Feb. 4, 2004, http://www.eeoc.gov/ada/adahandbook.html#dodonts (the Americans with
Disabilities Act allows employers to inquire about an applicants ability to perform job
requirements but employers should not inquire about medical conditions and treatment) (last
visited Nov. 14, 2007).
197. American Diabetes Association, Life Insurance Information for People with
Diabetes, http://www.diabetes.org/advocacy-and-legalresources/healthcare/lifeinsurance.j sp
(last visited Nov. 14, 2007) [hereinafter American Diabetes Association, Life Insurance
Information]. See generally N.Y. WORKERS' COMP. LAW §§ 200-206 (McKinney 2006);
Edward I. Pitts & Ronald E. Weiss 1-14 N.Y. Workers' Compensation Handbook § 14.08
(LexisNexis 2006). The New York State Disability Benefits Law requires most employers
to provide short-term disability insurance coverage to protect employees from loss of wages
(regardless of medical conditions such as diabetes) in the event that a disability is not
covered through worker's compensation. However, long-term disability insurance is not
required under the statute, and insurance companies may charge higher premiums or deny
coverage under such policies for high risk applicants, such as individuals with diabetes. Id.
198. See American Diabetes Association, Life Insurance Information, supra note 197.
199. Id; Steve Crawford, Obtaining Insurance for Diabetics, http://www.about-
disability-insurance.com/diabetes.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
200. Crawford, supra note 199.
201. See American Diabetes Association, Life Insurance Information, supra note 197;
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Because high AIC levels (as opposed to just a diabetic condition) can be
material to an insurer's decision whether to enter into a contract with an
applicant, an applicant's fraudulent non-disclosure of such information can
serve as a basis for the insurer to void the contract.20 2 For patients who are
not otherwise aware of their diabetes diagnosis or their poor management of
diabetes, a registry notification will create a new affirmative duty in the
patient to disclose those newly learned material facts when applying for a
new life or disability insurance policy. Such disclosure would adversely
affect the patient's ability to obtain insurance. 20 3 However, if the insurance
company already requires AIC testing at the time of the application, a
diabetic's duty to disclose his A IC level may be of little consequence.
In sum, the AIC registry notification system can trigger negative
insurance consequences for a diabetic. Receipt of a registry notification
could constitute a recommendation for "medical advice, diagnosis, care or
treatment," and possibly invoke a pre-existing condition exclusion under
204 feeafuture health insurance plans. Despite federal and state law protections,
employers may ask diabetics about their AIC levels or A1C notifications
and fire or refuse to hire them because of the heightened cost of insuring
them. Further, a diabetic who receives notice of an unfavorable AIC level
may then be required to disclose that information to disability or life
insurers, who will likely charge more or refuse coverage. These results
reflect the reality of an actuarially-based insurance system, where those
with a high risk of medical costs, disability, or premature death must bear a
greater burden in health, disability, or life insurance premiums.20 5
However, the potential loss of insurance or increase in insurance costs
resulting from an AIC notification is disconcerting considering the
mandatory nature of the AIC registry, which issues notifications without
consent (unless a diabetic affirmatively opts out).
D. Detrimental Effects on the Physician-Patient Relationship Arising From
the A I C Registry
Regardless of what disclosure protections may exist for diabetics, none
apply to physicians. In particular, nothing in New York's diabetes registry
statute prevents the information in the registry from being used to generate
aggregate data about individual physicians' patient populations. Depending
Crawford, supra note 199.
202. VANCE, supra note 91, at 372.
203. See generally Crawford, supra note 199 (stating that insurance companies will
perform the AIC test on diabetics at the time of application).
204. N.Y. INS. LAW § 3232(b) (McKinney 2006).
205. American Diabetes Association, Life Insurance Information, supra note 197;
American Diabetes Association, Commonly Asked Questions, supra note 165.
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on how that information is used, the registry could create incentives for
doctors to over- or under-prescribe the AIC test, or to over-medicate
patients with high A l C levels. These misuses of the A 1C test would result
in an erosion of patient confidence, and in turn, of the physician-patient
relationship. Further, the existence of the AIC program itself might
suggest to patients that doctors are incapable of properly treating diabetes,
in which case patients could come to trust the notices from the
NYCDOHMH in lieu of the advice of their own physicians. For a project
whose ultimate goal is to help patients by assisting their doctors, weakening
the physician-patient relationship would be highly undesirable.
1. Possible Harmful Incentives Created by the AIC Registry
Section 13.04(c) of New York City's Health Code requires clinical
laboratories to include the name and address of the doctor, along with
specific patient information, with each test result reported to the
NYCDOHMH for inclusion in the AIC Registry.2 °6 The statute goes on to
address patient confidentiality regarding personal information, but
prescribes no limits on the use of physician information.20 7
Potentially, the registry could be used to create a list of doctors who have
a high percentage of patients with elevated AIC levels. If so, the
implications for doctors could be significant: doctors could be stigmatized
or subjected to official discipline, some doctors may be seen as practicing
poor medicine when they are actually just willing to take on more high risk
patients, the registry could be used against doctors in malpractice suits, and
the registry could lead to higher malpractice insurance premiums for
doctors, depending on how poorly their patients are managing diabetes.
The mere fact that all these concerns exist indicates that the registry may
create powerful incentives for doctors to minimize their number of high-
A IC patients.
One might argue that use of AlC levels to measure physician
effectiveness is of minimal concern because patient AIC levels are so
tenuously related to the skill level of individual doctors. At best, a doctor
can prescribe medicine and give advice on lifestyle changes, but the
ultimate decision to heed the advice of the doctors rests with the individual
patients. Doctors in low income areas or those who cater to populations
with higher incidence of diabetes will necessarily have greater numbers of
patients with increased AIC levels, despite their best efforts to help these
206. Id.
207. RULES OF THE CITY OFNEWYORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04(d) (2003-2006).
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patients. Thus, because these numbers might tend to be misleading, one
would assume that they would not be used to rank doctors.
This assumption, however, might not be valid. For example, the New
Jersey Health Care Profile provides similarly misleading information, in the
form of malpractice payouts. This information is available to the public in
individual physician profiles via the New Jersey Health Care Profile.2 °8
The website even states that this information may be misleading, and notes
that "malpractice payments may be made for any number of reasons that
may not necessarily reflect negatively on the professional competence or
conduct of a practitioner.",20 9 Similarly, the State of New York has also
made physician-specific medical malpractice information available to the
public.
2 10
If information regarding medical malpractice payments by individual
doctors has been deemed important to individual consumers as a
comparative tool, despite the tenuous relationship between such payments
and the actual skill level of the physician, then it is certainly conceivable
that patient-population AIC scores might also be deemed informative.
While there are no known plans as of yet to use the AIC data in this way,
the possibility could create incentives for doctors to over-prescribe the test,
under-prescribe the test, or over-medicate patients with high AIC levels in
order to manipulate their number of patients with high AIC results.
If doctors are categorized based on the Al C performance of their patient
population, then some physicians might also be tempted to prescribe the test
to diabetic individuals whose blood sugar is well under control, in order to
dilute the numbers of tests coming back with high AIC levels. An even
more far-fetched, but still plausible, possibility is that doctors could
prescribe the test to individuals who are not diabetic at all, in order to
increase the number of their patients whose blood sugar is in control.
Alternatively, if doctors fear adverse action by state authorities because
they have too many patients with high AIC results, they may begin to
under-prescribe the test for those patients whose blood sugar is consistently
out of control. If patients with high AIC values are not tested, then their
results are not included in the registry, and thus the doctor's patient
population appears healthier.
208. Office of the Attorney General, Division of Consumer Affairs, New Jersey Health
Care Profile, http://12.150.185.184/dca (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
209. Id.
210. See N.Y. State Dep't of Health, Professional Misconduct and Physician Discipline,
http://www.health.state.ny.us/nysdoh/opmc/main.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2006). See also
Berkeley Rice, Publishing Physician Profiles: What's Fair?, MED. ECON., Dec. 17, 2004,.
available at http://www.memag.com/memag/issue/issueDetail.jsp?id=5255 (discussing the
public release of individual physicians' malpractice information).
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Additionally, if doctors are categorized based on the AIC performance
of their patient population, they might also have an incentive to over-
prescribe insulin (either in higher dosages or at more frequent intervals), in
order to reduce the number of patients whose blood sugar is out of control.
However, low blood sugar, and its dangerous side effects, may result when
too much insulin is absorbed, and detrimental side effects may also occur at
the site of injection. 21 1 Additionally, some individuals have dangerous
allergic reactions to insulin, including hives, difficulty in breathing and
swelling. 212  Besides insulin, doctors might prescribe other diabetes
medicines, but these too may have dangerous side effects, including
bloating, weight gain, leg swelling, liver disease, and anemia.213
In any of the above situations, doctors would no longer be acting in the
best interest of their patients, whether by prescribing unnecessary tests,
failing to prescribe tests in situations where the results would be extremely
valuable to the patient, or over-prescribing medications. If patients became
aware of these actions, the physician-patient relationship would almost
certainly suffer.
The physician-patient relationship could also suffer because of actions
taken by the patient. If the diabetes registry causes patients to be concerned
that their personal information will be turned over to the database, patient
self-medication could pose another area of concern. In recent years patients
have become increasingly involved in administering their own medications,
and this will only increase if patients fear taking tests where the results
must be recorded in a city-wide registry. It is particularly easy for diabetic
patients to overdose, because diabetes often correlates with other medical
problems, and patients may take medications for many different diseases. 214
The side effects of overdosing on insulin alone are extreme. Overdoses of
insulin can result in hypoglycemia, seizures, coma, and other negative
consequences. 215 Although more rare than accidental overdoses, intentional
overdoses of insulin have also been reported.216 Clearly, the effects of
overdosing are extremely severe for diabetics. If the diabetes registry leads
211. Drugs.com, Insulin, http://www.drugs.com/insulin.html (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
212. Id.
213. National Diabetes Information Clearinghouse, Medicines for People with Diabetes,
http://diabetes.niddk.nih.gov/dm/pubs/medicines_ez/specific.htm (last visited Nov. 14,
2007).
214. Taking Many Medications, 19 DIABETES SPECTRUM 39-40 (2006). See Nick I.
Batalis & Joseph A.Prahlow, Accidental Insulin Overdose, 49 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1117, 1119
(Sept. 2004).
215. Initiate Treatment Early to Avoid Fatality Following Antidiabetic Overdose, 14
DRUGS & THERAPY PERSP., Issue 5, August 1999, at 15.
216. Id. at 13.
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patients to treat themselves and avoid consulting with their physicians,
patients could suffer real harm.
Even those patients who are not concerned about the privacy
implications of the registry may nonetheless have misgivings about their
physicians because of the registry scheme. Patients could interpret the
registry's implementation as the government's statement that physicians are
not doing enough to combat the growing diabetes threat. Patient
notifications from the NYCDOHMH, originally intended to aid physicians
in working with their patients, might actually lead patients to distrust
physician consultation. Again, the physician-patient relationship would
suffer, this time from patients' unwillingness to cooperate with physicians.
2. Undue Reliance on the AIC Registry
Apart from harmful incentives caused by the registry, some physicians
may simply focus inordinately on the registry notifications as opposed to
actual test results. The notes immediately following § 13.04 of New York
City's Health Code suggest that the NYCDOHMH could use the AIC
registry to generate a list for clinicians highlighting patients under poor
control who may need intensified follow-up and therapy.2" 7 Further, the
initial small-scale version of the registry, being implemented in the South
Bronx, will send letters to individual patients when their AIC levels are
higher than eight percent and will provide daily alerts to physicians about
which patients have elevated A I C levels. 218
Physicians may eventually come to rely on these notices, rather than the
results of the AlC tests themselves, as diagnostic tools. The presence of a
notice would indicate that a patient had uncontrolled blood sugar, and the
absence of a notice would indicate that a patient's blood sugar was under
control, regardless of what the actual test results were. A common mistake
by a lab in sending an unnecessary notice or in failing to send a notice
where required, although seemingly harmless, might have devastating
consequences if compounded by a physician's failure to verify the actual
test results.
Detrimental reliance on the presence or absence of notices as a
diagnostic tool has already presented itself in the area of newborn
screening. All states have programs in place to test newborn infants for
certain diseases where early detection and treatment can benefit a child.2" 9
217. RULES OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, HEALTH CODE tit. 24, § 13.04 n. 1 (2003-2006).
218. BERGER & SILVER, supra note 46.
219. COMM. ON ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS, INST. OF MED., ASSESSING GENETIC RISKS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR HEALTH AND SOCIAL POLICY, 68-69 (Lori B. Andrews et al., eds.,
National Academy Press 1994).
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Problems have arisen, however, where physicians have come to assume that
the tests have been conducted and the absence of any result means that the
220 * hchild is healthy. In particular, the Maryland Department of Health and
Mental Hygiene has a webpage dedicated to the pitfalls of newborn
screening for hereditary disorders, where the primary mistake made by
doctors is "[a]ssuming that the result of the newborn screening test is
negative (or normal) because you have not heard otherwise."'2 l
Despite these concerns, it should be noted that there is little evidence
thus far that the Vermont Diabetes Information System ("VDIS"), upon
which the New York City registry is based, has led to any of the behaviors
described above. To date, only three patients in the VDIS have filed
complaints, and all were resolved satisfactorily.222 Nonetheless, the AIC
registry's lack of confidentiality provisions protecting physicians' privacy
opens the door to counterproductive interference in the physician-patient
relationship, and should be addressed accordingly.
PART III-RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
In light of the increasingly epidemic nature of diabetes, and the
detrimental health effects of the disease on its sufferers, the New York City
A 1C registry may be an initial step on the path toward better understanding
and management of the disease. The information gathered by the registry
may help determine which groups are most at risk, so that resources can be
directed to those groups. Information in the registry also may further
current research regarding the overall effects of the disease. However,
gathering this wealth of information may also detrimentally affect diabetics
and physicians, and therefore clear protections must be in place to ensure
that diabetics and physicians are not harmed by creation of the registry.
Specifically, an amended statute should expressly guarantee
confidentiality and security of patient data against use in court proceedings.
The statute should also more explicitly protect against inappropriate use of
patient information. Moreover, no use of private information, whether for
notification or research, should be permitted without the affirmative consent
of the patient. Secondary uses of the information, even for the purposes of
epidemiological studies, could also harm diabetics by encouraging
discrimination against certain groups who are found to be more prone to
diabetes. Therefore patients should have the opportunity to withhold their
220. Brian K. Stallsmith, Pitfalls in Newborn Screening, http://www.dhmh.state.md.us/
labs/html/NSpitfaIls.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
221. Id.
222. Littenburg & MacLean, Passive Consent for Clinical Research, supra note 76, at
207.
36 [Vol. 17
Whose Business is Your Pancreas?
information from any use that was not disclosed at the time the information
was initially provided. Finally, because of the concern that the registry will
cause the physician-patient relationship to suffer, physicians' names should
only be disclosed for purposes of notification. Other registries based on the
New York City scheme will undoubtedly trigger distinct problems, but
inlight of the New York registry, we suggest the following changes to the
current statutory framework:
"* We recommend that the statute expressly state that no information
contained in the registry may be subject to a subpoena.
"* Any patient notification system should be based on affirmative
consent, rather than on an opt-out system, in order to protect against
unwanted notification and minimize the risk of delivery error.
" Any use of private identifiable information for research purposes
should be permitted only after affirmative consent of the patient.
Patients should be afforded the opportunity to opt out of each
subsequent use not substantially related to the purpose for which the
initial consent was granted, even if private information is excised.
"* Both insurance companies and employers should be forbidden by
law to ask that individuals disclose their A l C results on employment
or insurance applications.
"* The Health Code should specifically protect physician privacy by
preventing disclosure of physician names other than for purposes of
notification.
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